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　[W]hile ‘pure’ systems of collective choice 
tend to be more appealing for theoretical 
studies of social decisions, they are often not 
the most useful systems to study. With this 
in view, this book [Collective Choice and 
Social Welfare] has been much concerned 
with ‘impurities’ of one kind or another, e.g., 
partial interpersonal comparability …, partial 
cardinality …, restricted domains …, intransi-
tive social indifference …, incomplete social 
preference …, and so on. The pure proce-
dures, which are more well-known, seem to 
be the limiting cases of these systems with 
impurities.
　Both from the point of view of institutions 
as well as that of framework of thought, the 
impure systems would appear to be rele-
vant. …. [W]hile purity is an uncomplicated 
virtue for olive oil, sea air and heroines of 





































　One approach, which can be called ‘tran-
scendental institutionalism,’ has two distinct 
features. First, it concentrates its attention 
on what it identifies as perfect justice, 
rather than on relative comparisons of jus-
tice and injustice. It tries only to identify 
social characteristics that cannot be tran-
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scended in terms of justice, and its focus is 
thus not on comparing feasible societies, all 
of which may fall short of the ideals of per-
fection. The inquiry is aimed at identifying 
the nature of ‘the just,’ rather than finding 
some criteria for an alternative being ‘less 
unjust’ than another. Second, in search for 
perfection, transcendental institutionalism 
concentrates primarily on getting the insti-
tutions right, and it is not directly focused 
on the actual societies that would ultimately 
emerge. … The overall result was to develop 
theories of justice that focused on transcen-
dental identification of the ideal institutions 




















































































　Social [choice] theory asks for too much 
out of the [social aggregation] process in 
that it asks for an entire ordering of the 
various social states (allocation in this case). 
The original question asked only for a “good” 
allocation; there was no requirement to rank 
all allocations. The fairness criterion in fact 
limits itself to answering the original ques-
tion. It is limited in that it gives no 
indication of the merits of two nonfair allo-
cations, but by restricting itself in this way 
it allows for a reasonable solution to the 
original problem [Varian (1974, p. 65)].
　The requirement of a social ordering is 
indeed problematic at first sight: Why would 
we want to know the 193th best alterna-
tive? Only the first best is required for the 


























　I suppose Meade’s effort could be described 
as fundamental welfare economics, but wel-
fare economics with red corpuscles, not the 
sort of attenuated theory that concludes 
that if only everything were convex and 
everybody knew everything and there were 
perfect markets for all future contingent 
commodities, including contingencies for 
which no vocabulary now exists, then with 
costless lump-sum transfers we could make 
all for the best in the best of imaginable 
worlds. Meade expects welfare economics 
to provide advice, not resignation [Solow 
(1987, p. 986)].
　ソローがいう《血の通った厚生経済学》（Wel-
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